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License 4.0 (CC BY-NC).How to detect high-performing individuals and groups:
Decision similarity predicts accuracy
R. H. J. M. Kurvers1,2*, S. M. Herzog1, R. Hertwig1, J. Krause2, M. Moussaid1, G. Argenziano3,
I. Zalaudek4, P. A. Carney5, M. Wolf2
Distinguishing between high- and low-performing individuals and groups is of prime importance in a wide
range of high-stakes contexts. While this is straightforward when accurate records of past performance exist,
these records are unavailable in most real-world contexts. Focusing on the class of binary decision problems, we
use a combined theoretical and empirical approach to develop and test a approach to this important problem.
First, we use a general mathematical argument and numerical simulations to show that the similarity of an
individual’s decisions to others is a powerful predictor of that individual’s decision accuracy. Second, testing
this prediction with several large datasets on breast and skin cancer diagnostics, geopolitical forecasting, and a
general knowledge task, we find that decision similarity robustly permits the identification of high-performing
individuals and groups. Our findings offer a simple, yet broadly applicable, heuristic for improving real-world
decision-making systems.INTRODUCTION
Identifying high-performing individuals and collectives is a key chal-
lenge in a wide range of high-stakes contexts, from medical and psy-
chological diagnostics and lie detection to economic and political
forecasting, environmental risk analyses, and investment decisions
(1–9). Telling them apart is relatively straightforward when accurate re-
cords of past performance exist (5, 9, 10). In many real-world contexts,
however, these records do not exist or are inaccessible due to ethical or
legal constraints (11–13). Themost common approach, then, is to iden-
tify high performers based on proxies that are thought to correlate with
decision accuracy, such as experience or reputation, or self-identified
or peer-assessed expertise (14–16). The purported correlations between
accuracy and these proxies, however, are often poorly understood,
complex, and context dependent (4, 8, 16). Focusing on the class of
binary decision problems, we here use a combined theoretical and em-
pirical approach to develop and test a previously unidentified method
for selecting high-performing individuals and groups—crucially, this
method relies solely on inputs that are readily observable and does
not require information about past decision accuracy of individuals.
We proceed as follows. First, we use a general mathematical ar-
gument to show that—in any binary decision task inwhich individuals
are, on average, more often correct than not—the similarity of an in-
dividual’s decision to those of others (i.e., the average percentage
agreement with others) is tightly correlated with that individual’s de-
cision accuracy. Second, using numerical simulations, we show that
this correlation between decision similarity and accuracy is observed
even when one relaxes the two simplifying assumptions underlying
our analytical result (i.e., when decisions of different individuals are
correlated and/or when decision similarity is calculated from small
samples)—as long as the average accuracy of decision makers exceeds
0.5. Third, using several large datasets from three different domains—medical diagnostics, geopolitical forecasting, and general knowledge—
we show that (i) in each of these domains, as predicted, the decision
similarity of an individual is tightly correlated with that individual’s
decision accuracy, and (ii) this association can be exploited to reliably
detect both high-performing individuals and groups.RESULTS
Analytical result: Decision similarity correlates with
decision accuracy
Consider a pool of N decision makers facing a binary decision prob-
lem (e.g., dermatologists classifying a skin lesion as benign or malig-
nant; forecasters predicting whether a regime will still be in power
1 year from now), individuals differ in their average accuracy pi, i =
1…N. Suppose we confront each individual with the same set of cases
(e.g., skin lesions, forecasts), and let us compare the decisions of each
individual to the decisions of a “benchmark individual” judging the
same cases. More specifically, for each individual i, we define the de-
cision similarity Si as the fraction of cases for which this individual
makes the same decision as the benchmark individual. The expected
value of this decision similarity is
EðSiÞ ¼ pi ⋅pþ ð1 piÞ ⋅ð1 pÞ ð1Þ
where p is the probability that the benchmark individual is correct in
any particular case. To see how our similarity measure depends on
individual accuracy levels, we compare the expected decision similar-
ity (to the benchmark individual) for two individuals j and i, which is
given by
EðSjÞ  EðSiÞ ¼ ðpj  piÞ ⋅ð2 ⋅p 1Þ ð2Þ
Crucially, as can be seen from Eq. 2, whenever the benchmark in-
dividual is more often correct than incorrect (i.e., p > 0.5), individuals
with a higher accuracy will be characterized by a higher expected de-
cision similarity, that is, pj > pi⇔ E(Sj) > E(Si). That is, the higher an
individual’s decision similarity, the more accurate this individual’s
decisions are, provided the benchmark individual performs above1 of 10
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cision similarity and accuracy when comparing a focal individual to
different benchmark individuals.
To illustrate the mechanism underlying the similarity-accuracy re-
lationship as clear as possible, we have, up to now, considered the case
where we compare the decisions of individuals to the decisions of a
single benchmark individual. In practice, however, one may not know
whether a particular decisionmaker performs above chance level. This
problem can be solved by comparing the decisions of individuals to
those of several other individuals. To see this, let us define the average
decision similarity Si of individual i as the average percentage agree-
ment of this individual with all other N − 1 individuals, that is, for
individual i, we calculate the percentage agreement with every other
individual j (j ≠ i) and take the average of these N − 1 percentages
EðSiÞ ¼
∑
j¼1…N;j≠i
ðpi ⋅pj þ ð1 piÞ ⋅ð1 pjÞÞ
N  1 ð3Þ
As above, we compare the expected decision similarity of two in-
dividuals j and i, which is given by
EðSjÞ  EðSiÞ ¼ ðpj  piÞ ⋅ N  2N  1 ⋅ð2 ⋅p  1Þ ð4Þ
wherep is the average decision accuracy of all individuals in the pool
after excluding individuals j and i. As can be seen from Eq. 4, and
analogous to our result above, whenever the remaining pool of indi-
viduals (i.e., excluding individuals j and i) is, on average, more often
correct than incorrect (i.e., p > 0:5), the individual with the higher
accuracy is characterized by a higher expected average decision simi-
larity, that is
pj > pi⇔EðSjÞ > EðSiÞ ð5ÞKurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019Thus, for any pool of candidate decisionmakers where the average
accuracy of individuals is above 0.5 (more precisely, where the average
accuracy of individuals remains above 0.5 after excluding every pos-
sible pair of individuals), the higher an individual’s average decision
similarity, the more accurate this individual’s decisions are. Figure 1B
illustrates this predicted relationship for a pool of 10 individuals with
decision accuracies of 0.55, 0.6, 0.65,…1.0, respectively.
Numerical simulations: Small samples and
correlated decisions
The above result suggests that the similarity of an individual’s
decisions to the decisions of others—which can be readily observed
when confronting individuals with a series of decision problems—is
a powerful proxy for an individual’s decision accuracy, provided the
average accuracy of individuals exceeds 0.5. However, our analysis
above is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, it is based on
the expected value of decision similarity, that is, situations where for
each individual a very large number of decisions are available for
calculating that individual’s decision similarity. Second, we assumed
that decisions of different individuals are statistically independent
from each other, that is, for any particular case, the accuracy pi of in-
dividual i is independent of any other individual j ≠ i being correct or
incorrect. To investigate the robustness of the similarity-accuracy re-
lationship, we performed numerical simulations across a broad range
of statistical environments relaxing these assumptions.We focused on
different populations of decision makers (i.e., populations differing in
their accuracy distribution) using the beta distribution, systematically
varying the a and b shape parameters between 1 and 10 (Fig. 2A).
These populations differ in their average accuracy, variance, and skew-
ness, encompassing a wide variety of accuracy distributions. For each
of these populations, we repeatedly and randomly sampled groups of
10 decision makers (i.e., individuals characterized by a given accuracy
level) and confronted these individuals with a number of decision
cases. We then investigated the strength and direction of the correla-
tion between the observed decision similarity and decision accuracy,Fig. 1. Analytical prediction: Decision similarity is tightly associated with decision accuracy in binary decision problems. (A) When compared with a benchmark
individual with p > 0.5, the expected decision similarity E(Si) of individual i increases with its accuracy level pi ; the different lines correspond to benchmark individuals
with different levels of accuracy. (B) When comparing the decisions of individuals to the decisions of all other individuals in a pool of candidate decision makers, the
expected average decision similarity of individuals is tightly correlated with individual accuracy, as long as the average accuracy of individuals in the pool is above 0.5
(more precisely, as long as the average accuracy of individuals remains above 0.5 after excluding every possible pair of individuals, see Eq. 4). The panel illustrates this
for a pool of 10 decision makers with decision accuracies of 0.55, 0.60, 0.65,…1.0, respectively. The expected decision similarity is calculated using Eq. 3.2 of 10
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similarity (10, 25, and 100) and (ii) the degree towhich the decisions of
different individuals are correlated with each other (0, 0.5, and 1.0; see
Materials and Methods).
Figure 2B shows the results of this analysis. Within each subpanel,
the different tiles correspond to the different populations (i.e., accuracy
distributions) of the associated tiles in Fig. 2A. While tiles below the
diagonal (i.e., a > b) correspond to populationswith an average individ-
ual accuracy above 0.5, tiles above the diagonal (i.e., a < b) correspond
to populations with an average individual accuracy below 0.5. As can be
seen from Fig. 2B, independent of the specific accuracy distribution,
whenever the average individual accuracy in the population exceeds
0.5 (tiles below the diagonal), we find a positive correlation between de-
cision similarity and accuracy. As expected, the strength of this corre-
lation increases as (i) more observations are available to calculate
decision similarity (moving from the left to the right panels), and
(ii) decisions of individuals are less correlated with each other (moving
from the bottom to the top panels). The correlation between decision
similarity and accuracy can be observed in almost all scenarios (with
the exception of the most extreme scenario of few samples and max-
imally correlated decisions). Our analysis, thus, strongly suggests that
the similarity-accuracy relationship is robust.Kurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019Despite having considered a broad range of conditions in our nu-
merical simulations, these simulations do not cover all conceivable sce-
narios. For simplicity, we have assumed that correlations do not differ
systematically between subgroups of individuals and/or cases. In the
presence of these systematic differences, scenarios are conceivable
where the positive correlation between decision similarity and accuracy
will not be observed, even when the average accuracy of individuals ex-
ceeds 0.5 (see the Supplementary Materials for an example).
Empirical analysis: Identifying high-performing individual
decision makers
Our analysis above suggests that selecting decision makers based on
their decisions’ similarity to those of others should be a powerful and
broadly applicable approach to identifying high performers. To test
this prediction in real-world contexts, we analyzed data from several
published datasets from three domains: medical diagnostics, geo-
political forecasting, and general knowledge. In particular, we investi-
gated (i) a breast cancer dataset comprising 15,655 diagnoses by 101
radiologists based on 155mammograms (17); (ii) a skin cancer dataset
comprising 4320 diagnoses by 40 dermatologists based on 108 der-
moscopic images of skin lesions (18); (iii) a geopolitical forecasting
dataset from the Good Judgment Project containing 8460 forecastsFig. 2. Numerical simulations: The similarity-accuracy relationship is observed when similarity is calculated from a few samples and the decisions of different
individuals are correlated with each other. (A) For the numerical simulations, we sampled decision makers from a wide range of populations of decision makers
differing in their performance distribution (x axis, individual accuracy; y axis, probability density). We created those by systematically varying the two shape parameters
a (values on top) and b (values on the right) of the beta distribution. Dashed vertical lines indicate the chance level of raters (i.e., accuracy of 0.5). (B) Average correlation
coefficient between decision similarity and accuracy for 10 raters making 10, 25, and 100 decisions (subpanel columns) and for different degrees of correlations (0, 0.5,
and 1; subpanel rows) between the decisions of different individuals (see Materials and Methods). Within each subpanel, the tiles correspond to raters drawn from the
population (i.e., accuracy distribution) of the associated a-b combination in (A). Tiles below (above) the diagonal correspond to populations with an average individual
accuracy above (below) 0.5; increasingly red (blue) colors indicate increasingly positive (negative) correlations. All results are averages over 2500 random samples.
Whenever individual accuracy is above 0.5, we find a positive correlation between similarity and accuracy. While this correlation can be observed even in the most
extreme scenarios with maximum correlation between the decisions of different decision makers (bottom row), generally, the strength of this correlation increases as
the correlation between the decisions of decision makers decreases.3 of 10
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general knowledge questions (here, which of two cities is larger)
containing 99,000 decisions by 99 individuals on 1000 questions
(20). For the medical datasets, the patient’s actual health state (i.e.,
cancer present versus absent) was known from follow-up research
(see Materials and Methods). Similarly, for the forecasting dataset,
the correctness of the forecasts was determined from follow-up re-
search. Figure S1 shows that in each of the datasets, (i) decision ma-
kers differ substantially in their individual performance, (ii) average
individual accuracy is substantially above chance level, and (iii)
decisions of different individuals are moderately correlated.
To test our basic prediction that individuals’ decision similarity is
positively correlated with their decision accuracy, we created, within
each dataset, all possible pairs of decision makers and calculated, for
each pair, their percentage agreement. As in our analysis above, each
individual’s average decision similarity was defined as its average per-
centage agreement with all other individuals. As predicted, we found a
strong positive correlation in all four datasets between an individual’s
average decision similarity and accuracy (Fig. 3; Spearman’s rank cor-
relations: breast cancer: rs = 0.56, P < 0.001; skin cancer: rs = 0.83,
P < 0.001; geopolitical events: rs = 0.84, P < 0.001; city demographics:
rs = 0.84, P < 0.001). The network graphs in fig. S2 illustrate that while
high performers are similar to other high performers, low performers
are not similar to other low performers. That is, high performers per-
formwell in the sameway, whereas low performance is poor inmyriad
ways. Figure S3 zooms in on the case level, showing that—in line with
our results above (Eq. 4)—high similarity is associated with high accu-
racy for cases in which the majority of the population is correct (a.k.a.Kurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019“kind” cases), but not for cases in which the minority of the population
is correct (a.k.a. “wicked” cases). Figure S4 shows that the positive rela-
tionship between similarity and accuracy is also observed when using
the continuous probability scale in the forecasting dataset (rather than
the binary yes/no scale).
To test whether the correlation between decision similarity and
accuracy can be exploited to predict which individuals are high per-
formers, we completed cross-validation procedures using training
and test sets. In the training set, we calculated the similarity measure
as above and selected individuals on that basis.We then looked at the
performance of the selected individuals in the test set. To investigate
how the number of decisions used to calculate decision similarity and
the selection criterion (i.e., threshold of decision similarity) affected
the selected individuals’ performance, we repeated this analysis for
training sets ranging from 0 to 60 cases in size and using selection
criteria ranging from including individuals whose decision similarity
was among the top 50%, top 25%, or top 5% in the training set (see
Materials andMethods). Figure 4 shows the results of this analysis: In
each of the three domains (medical diagnostics, geopolitical forecast-
ing, and general knowledge), selecting individuals based on decision
similarity is a powerful way to select high performers. Even when eval-
uating only a small number of cases in the training set and using a
lenient selection criterion (e.g., top 50%), our approach succeeds in
selecting individuals who perform substantially above average in theFig. 3. Decision similarity tightly correlates with decision accuracy in breast
and skin cancer diagnostics, geopolitical forecasting, and a general knowl-
edge task. (A to D) In all four datasets, we find, as predicted (Figs. 1 and 2), a
positive relationship between individuals’ average decision similarity (i.e., average
percentage of agreement with others) and accuracy. In (A) and (B), accuracy is
expressed as balanced accuracy, and in (C) and (D), as proportion correct (see
Materials and Methods). Lines are robust linear regression lines.Fig. 4. Decision similarity robustly permits the identification of high-
performing individuals. (A to D) The average performance of individuals in a
test set selected on the basis of their decision similarity in a training set, for dif-
ferent decision similarity thresholds (e.g., the top 25% corresponds to the 25% of
raters with the highest decision similarity in the training set) and different
numbers of training images (i.e., number of decisions used to calculate decision
similarity). As can be seen, in all four datasets, selecting individuals based on de-
cision similarity substantially increases the average performance in the pool of
decision makers. As predicted, when increasing the size of the training set and/
or applying a stricter selection criterion, the average accuracy of the selected in-
dividuals increases. In (A) and (B), accuracy is expressed as balanced accuracy, and
in (C) and (D), as proportion correct.4 of 10
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a stricter selection criterion, the average accuracy of the selected indivi-
duals increases. Figure 4 focuses on selecting a subset of high performers
from a relatively large pool of individuals (101 for breast cancer, 40 for
skin cancer, 90 for geopolitical events, and 99 for city demographics).
The same approach can be used to identify (relatively) low performers
(fig. S5) and to select high and low performers from pools as small as
three individuals (fig. S6).
Wisdom of crowds: Identifying high-performing groups
The similarity-accuracy relationship also has important implications for
harnessing the “wisdom of crowds” when pooling multiple decision
makers’ independent decisions pertaining to the same case (21–23).
One of the most commonly used aggregation rules is the majority rule
(24, 25), which is known to outperform individual decision-making
in a variety of contexts, including medical diagnostics and forecasting
(7, 26–30). All other things being equal, the performance of the ma-
jority rule will increase with the average accuracy of the decisionmakers
in that group—provided that individuals are, on average, more often
correct than not (25, 31). Consequently, our analysis above suggests that
under a majority rule, groups consisting of individuals with relatively
high decision similarity should outperform groups with relatively low
similarity, because the individuals’ decision similarity is positively
correlated to their accuracy. Figure 5A illustrates this prediction, using
a hypothetical example of eight groups of three identical decision
makers with accuracies of 0.60, 0.65,…0.95, respectively.
To test this prediction pertaining to groups empirically, within each
dataset, we randomly sampled groups of three individuals and com-Kurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019bined their decisions using the majority rule (i.e., we selected, for each
case, the decision that received either two or three votes). We then in-
vestigated how the average decision similarity among group members
affected their collective accuracy. Consistent with our prediction, we
find a positive relationship between decision similarity and collective
accuracy (filled dots, Fig. 5, B to E). This effect is driven by the strong
positive relationship between the decision similarity of group members
and the average individual accuracy (opendots, Fig. 5, B to E). As shown
in fig. S7, these results generalize to larger group sizes.
To test whether this relationship can be exploited to identify high-
performing groups of individuals from a larger pool of groups, we
again ran cross-validation procedures using training and test sets (see
Materials andMethods). Figure 6 shows the results: In each of the three
domains, selecting groups of individuals with a high-average deci-
sion similarity is a powerful method of identifying high-performing
groups. Mirroring our results above, as we increase the size of the
training set and/or apply a stricter selection criterion, the accuracy of
the groups increases. While Fig. 6 focuses on identifying high-
performing groups, the same approach can be used to identify low-
performing groups (fig. S8).
Similarity to the majority
While our analyses above are based on the average decision similar-
ity of individuals to others, a closely related approach is based on the
similarity of individuals to the majority decision (i.e., the frequency
of cases for which an individual makes the same decision as the ma-
jority). In the SupplementaryMaterials, we show that both approaches
give rise to qualitatively the same analytical predictions, implying thatFig. 5. The decision similarity within a group is tightly associated with that group’s collective accuracy under the majority vote. (A) Illustrative example of the
relationship between the expected average decision similarity, the average individual accuracy of group members (open dots), and the expected performance of the
majority rule (filled dots), for eight groups of three identical decision makers with accuracies of 0.60, 0.65,…0.95, respectively. Decision similarity is calculated using
Eq. 3, and the expected accuracy of the majority rule is calculated using the binomial distribution given by p3 + 3 ⋅ p2 ⋅ (1 − p). (B to E) As predicted, in all datasets,
we find a strong positive correlation between the average decision similarity among group members and their collective performance under the majority rule (filled
dots and solid robust regression lines). This pattern is driven by a strong positive relationship between the average decision similarity among group members and
the average individual performance of group members (open dots, dashed robust regression lines). In (B) and (C), accuracy is expressed as balanced accuracy, and in
(D) and (E), as proportion correct.5 of 10
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lecting individuals based on their similarity to the majority decision.
In line with this, fig. S9 shows that, in each of the four datasets, there is
a tight positive correlation between an individual’s average decision
similarity to others and that individual’s similarity to the majority de-
cision. Thus—as in the case of average decision similarity to others—
there is a positive correlation between an individual’s similarity to the
majority decision and that individual’s accuracy (fig. S10), and this
relationship also permits the identification of high-performing indivi-
duals and groups.
Note that selecting individuals with the highest similarity values—
be it the average decision similarity to others or the similarity to the
majority—does not imply that these approaches aim to approximate
the performance of the majority rule. To see this, note that both simi-
larity measures tightly correlate with decision accuracy. Selecting the
most similar individuals thus aims at selecting the most accurate in-
dividuals which—dependent on the distribution of accuracies and the
group size—may perform systematically better or worse than the ma-
jority rule (see the Supplementary Materials for examples).DISCUSSION
To summarize, on the basis of a general mathematical argument and
numerical simulations, we predicted that in binary decision problemsKurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019in which individuals are, on average, more often correct than not, (i) an
individual’s decision similarity to others is tightly correlated with that
individual’s decision accuracy, and (ii) this correlation can be used to
identify high-performing individuals and groups of decision makers.
Our analyses of four large datasets from three domains (medical diag-
nostics, geopolitical forecasting, and general knowledge) confirm these
predictions. On the basis of these findings, we propose a widely appli-
cable and robust method of identifying high-performing individuals
and groups for binary decision problems. This method is captured by
a simple and easily applicable heuristic: Faced with the task of identify-
ing high performers from a pool of candidate decision makers (whose
decision accuracy is unknown), observe a series of decisions of indivi-
duals and select those individuals (or groups) who make decisions that
are most similar to others.
The practical use of our approach resides in that our method re-
lies solely on input that is readily observable and does not require any
knowledge about individuals’ past performance. However, it does re-
quire that the average individual accuracy in the pool of candidate
decision makers exceeds 50% (see Eq. 4 and Fig. 2). Arguably, it is a
reasonable expectation that in many, if not most, binary decision
problems, this condition is fulfilled. Moreover, while information on
individuals’ relative performance can be noisy, difficult, and costly to
obtain—or unavailable—our approach requires only population-level
information about whether or not individuals in the pool of candi-
date decisionmakers are, on average, more often correct than not. For
practical implementation, we have two concrete recommendations.
First, since our method aims at distinguishing between high- and
low-performing individuals and groups, the benefits of our approach
increasewith larger expectedperformance differences between individ-
uals in a domain. Second, in all four datasets, we found that observing
around 20 to 30 decisions was enough to reliably identify high-
performing individuals (Fig. 4) and groups (Fig. 6), as well as low-
performing individuals and groups (figs. S5 and S8, respectively). That
is, one may often not need more decisions to reliably categorize indi-
viduals and groups.
The positive relationship between similarity to others and accu-
racy can break down when correlations differ systematically be-
tween different subgroups of individuals and/or cases (see the
Supplementary Materials for an example). The datasets we investi-
gated, however, did not provide any evidence for this. In addition,
in our datasets, the tight positive relationship between decision si-
milarity to others and accuracy is only observed for cases in which
the majority is correct (fig. S3). For these “kind” cases, individuals
making the correct decision also had higher decision similarity.
However, for “wicked” cases, we did not observe this relationship,
showing that—while our approach does select high-performing in-
dividuals—it does not succeed in selecting individuals that solve
these more difficult cases. Prelec et al. (32) showed that identifying
answers that are more popular than people predict can help in
solving these wicked cases.
In our mathematical and numerical analyses, we have assumed
that each individual decisionmaker is characterized by a single num-
ber corresponding to the probability to be correct in any particular
case. Although this is a common assumption made for analytical
tractability, in many binary decision problems, the world is in one
of two states (33, 34) (e.g., cancer present versus cancer absent)
and the accuracy of an individual may differ between these states
(e.g., sensitivity versus specificity of a decision maker). A more gen-
eral framework would, thus, characterize each individual bymultipleFig. 6. Decision similarity permits identification of high-performing groups
of individuals. (A to D) The average collective performance of groups in a test
set, using the majority rule, when groups of individuals are selected on the basis
of decision similarity in a training set, for different similarity thresholds (e.g., the
top 25% corresponds to groups containing individuals with the 25% highest de-
cision similarity values) and different numbers of training images (i.e., number of
decisions used to calculate decision similarity). As can be seen, in all datasets,
selecting groups of individuals based on decision similarity substantially increases
the average collective performance. As predicted, the performance of the selected
groups of individuals in the test set increases with the number of training images as
well as with a stricter threshold value. The purple line (“Average”) refers to the av-
erage majority rule performance of all groups in the test set. In (A) and (B), accuracy
is expressed as balanced accuracy, and in (C) and (D), as proportion correct.6 of 10
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Eaccuracies corresponding to the accuracies in each of these states. It
will be interesting to investigate the consequences of such a more
general conceptualization for the here developed ideas.
It is widely held that groups must harbor high diversity to max-
imize collective performance (35, 36). When selecting members of
decision-making groups, it is worth remembering that diversity is
multidimensional and complex, encompassing individual differences
on dimensions ranging from gender, ethnicity, age, and educational
background to cognitive diversity and the correlation of errors among
decision makers (37, 38). Although some dimensions of diversity are
known to boost collective accuracy (35, 36), other dimensions can
have negative consequences for collective performance, as illustrated
here. Counterintuitively, selecting individuals who make similar deci-
sions collectively outperforms selecting individuals whose decisions
are dissimilar. Bahrami and colleagues (39, 40) recently showed that
two heads collectively outperform the ability of any single pair mem-
ber whenever the pair members are of similar visual sensitivity [see
also (7)]. Whether (and when) decision similarity reflects similarity
in visual sensitivity or, perhaps, can complement it is a promising
avenue for future research.
A related question is what underlies the observed differences in
agreement level between decision makers. Einhorn (41) distinguishes
between agreement “in fact” and agreement “in principle,” the former
referring to agreement of actual decisions, whereas the latter has to do
with agreement about information and how it should be weighted in
formulating a decision. Since we only have evaluated agreement “in
fact,” we cannot evaluate the extent to which the decision makers
would agree in principle, and it will be interesting to investigate this
issue in future research. Future work could also focus on the question
to what extent the differences in agreement are the direct result of dif-
ferences in individual accuracies (the approachwe have followed here,
but see the Supplementary Materials), or whether there are additional
sources of covariation. For example, by using the k statistic (instead of
percentage agreement), which is a measure of interrater agreement
that quantifies the agreement beyond that already expected by chance.
Our approach shares similarities to cognitive models based on cul-
tural consensus theory (CCT) that use the agreement among indivi-
duals in answering a common set of questions to simultaneously
estimate individuals’ competences, response tendencies, and the “cul-
turally correct” answers to the questions—by up-weighting the opin-
ions of individuals with higher estimated competence (42–45). While
a CCT approach is based on cognitive models aimed at describing
the cognitive process involved in answering questions by estimating
latent variables, our approach is substantially simpler: Instead of
making assumptions about the cognitive process underlying decisions,
it simply focuses on identifying individuals or groups with high future
performance. Notwithstanding those differences, both approaches illus-
trate how agreement among people can be used to improve decision-
making systems.
The finding that decision similarity can be harnessed to predict
the future performance of individuals and groups is both powerful
and simple. While we tested this prediction in medical diagnostics,
geopolitical forecasting, and a general knowledge task, we expect sim-
ilar results in other binary decision problems. Further developing
and testing our approach in nonbinary decision-making contexts
will be an important next step (see also fig. S4). We believe that
the decision similarity-accuracy relationship offers a powerful ap-
proach to improve real-world systems of individual and collective
decision-making.Kurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019MATERIALS AND METHODS
Numerical simulations
From each of the different populations of decisionmakers (Fig. 2A), we
repeatedly sampled sets of 10 decisionmakers. Each of these 10 decision
makers was characterized by a single value pi indicating its average
individual accuracy. Next, given this average accuracy, each of these
decision makers evaluated M cases (10, 25, or 100). To illustrate, a
decision maker with pi = 0.7 evaluating 100 cases would be charac-
terized by a vector of 100 values, where each value is either 0 (incorrect
decision) or 1 (correct decision), drawn from a Bernoulli distribution
with probability of 0.7 for a correct decision.
To study the effect of correlations between the decisions of different
decisionmakers, we used an “opinion leader” approach (25). One of the
10 individuals was randomly assigned as the opinion leader, and we
fixed the sequence of this individual’s decisions (i.e., the sequence of
0s and 1s). Then, for all remaining individuals, the sequence of their
decisions was paired to the opinion leader’s sequence, depending on a
correlation parameter pc (0≤ pc≤ 1). In particular, starting at case i= 1,
for each case, with probability (1 − pc), we randomly selected a decision
from the set of remaining cases from that individual (i.e., decisions from
cases j that have not yet been selected, j≥ i), and with probability pc, we
took the same decision as the decision of the opinion leader from this
set. If the same decision was not present in the set of remaining
decisions of that individual, we randomly selected a decision from this
set. We then moved on to the next case i + 1. This procedure, thus, in-
troduces different levels of correlation between decision makers, ran-
ging from 0 (maximum amount of independence) to 1 (maximum
amount of dependence) while not changing the frequency of 0s and
1s for each decision maker. Note that even if pc = 1, there can still be
disagreement between a pair of raters, namely, when the numbers of 0s
and 1s in their respective vectors are not equal.
Next, we calculated, for each individual, his or her average percent-
age of agreement with the other nine decision makers over allM cases.
Last, we calculated the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between
the average percentage agreement and average individual accuracy (pi)
across the 10 decisionmakers. For each unique combination of (i) num-
ber of casesM, (ii) level of correlations pc, and (iii) population accuracy
distribution (Fig. 2A), we repeated this procedure 2500 times, and we
show values averaged across all repetitions (color codes in Fig. 2B).
Breast cancer dataset
The full information on the breast cancer dataset can be found in (17),
andwe summarized the dataset in (7). Therefore, we here provide a brief
summary. Mammograms were randomly selected from screening
examinations performed on women aged 40 to 69 between 2000 and
2003 from U.S. mammography registries affiliated with the Breast
Cancer Surveillance Consortium (BCSC; Carolina Mammography
Registry, New Hampshire Mammography Network, New Mexico
Mammography Project, Vermont Breast Cancer Surveillance System,
and Group Health Cooperative in western Washington). Radiologists
who interpretedmammograms at facilities affiliatedwith these registries
between January 2005 and December 2006 were invited to participate
in this study, as were radiologists from Oregon, Washington, North
Carolina, San Francisco, and New Mexico. Of the 409 radiologists
invited, 101 completed all procedures and were included in the data
analyses. Each screening examination included images from the current
examination and one previous examination (allowing the radiologists to
compare potential changes over time) and presented the craniocaudal
and mediolateral oblique views of each breast (four views per woman7 of 10
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Efor each of the screening and comparison examinations). This approach
is standard practice in the United States. Women who were diagnosed
with cancer within 12 months of the mammograms were classified as
patients with cancer (n = 27). Women who remained cancer free for a
period of 2 years were classified as noncancerous patients (n = 128; 17%
prevalence).
Radiologists viewed the digitized images on a computer (home
computer, office computer, or laptop provided as part of the original
study). All computers were required to meet all viewing requirements
of clinical practice, including a large screen andhigh-resolution graphics
(≥1280 × 1024 pixels and a 1280-megabyte video card with 32-bit
color). Radiologists saw two images at the same time (left and right
breasts) and were able to alternate quickly (≤1 s) between paired
images, to magnify a selected part of an image, and to identify ab-
normalities by clicking on the screen. Each case presented craniocaudal
andmediolateral oblique views of both breasts simultaneously, followed
by each view in combination with its prior comparison image. Cases
were shown in random order. Radiologists were instructed to diagnose
them using the same approach they used in clinical practice (i.e., using
the breast imaging reporting and data system lexicon to classify their
diagnoses, including their decision that a woman be recalled for further
examination). Radiologists evaluated the cases in two stages. In stage 1,
four test sets were created, each containing 109 cases. Radiologists were
randomly assigned to one of the four test sets. In stage 2, one test set
containing 110 cases was created and presented to all radiologists. Some
of the cases used in stage 2 had already been evaluated by some of the
radiologists in stage 1. To avoid having the same radiologist evaluate a
case twice, we excluded all cases from stage 2 that had already been
viewed by that radiologist in stage 1. Moreover, we only included cases
present in all four test sets to ensure that each radiologist evaluated the
same set of cases, resulting in 155 unique cases. Between the two stages,
radiologists were randomly assigned to one of three intervention treat-
ments. Because there were no strong treatment differences (46), we
pooled the data from stages 1 and 2. In our analysis, we treated the
recommendation that a woman should be recalled for further exam-
ination as a positive test result.
The breast cancer data were assembled at the BCSC Statistical
CoordinatingCenter in Seattle and analyzed at theMaxPlanck Institute
for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. Each registry received
institutional review board approval for active and passive consent
processes or was granted a waiver of consent to enroll participants, pool
data, and perform statistical analysis. All procedures were in accordance
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. All data
were anonymized to protect the identities of women, radiologists, and
facilities.
Skin cancer dataset
The full information on the skin cancer dataset can be found in (18),
and we summarized the dataset in (7, 27). Therefore, we here provide
a brief summary. This dataset comprises 4320 diagnoses by 40 derma-
tologists of 108 skin lesions and were collected during a web-based con-
sensus meeting (the Consensus Net Meeting on Dermoscopy). Skin
lesions were obtained from theDepartment of Dermatology, University
Federico II (Naples, Italy); the Department of Dermatology, University
of L’Aquila (Italy); the Department of Dermatology, University of Graz
(Austria); the Sydney Melanoma Unit, Royal Prince Alfred Hospital
(Camperdown, Australia); and the Skin and Cancer Associates (Planta-
tion, Florida). The lesions were selected on the basis of the photographic
quality of the clinical and dermoscopic images available. The aim of theKurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019study was to diagnose whether or not a skin lesion was amelanoma, the
most dangerous type of skin cancer. Histopathological specimens of
all skin lesions were available and judged by a histopathology panel
(melanoma, n = 27; no melanoma, n = 81; 25% prevalence). All par-
ticipating dermatologists had at least 5 years of experience in dermo-
scopy practice, teaching, and research. They first underwent a training
procedure in which they familiarized themselves with the study’s de-
finitions and procedures in web-based tutorials with 20 sample skin
lesions. They subsequently evaluated 108 skin lesions in a two-step
online procedure. First, they used an algorithm to differentiate melano-
cytic from nonmelanocytic lesions. Whenever a lesion was evaluated as
melanocytic, dermatologists were asked to classify it as either amelano-
maor a benignmelanocytic lesion using four different algorithms.Here,
we focus on the diagnostic algorithm with the highest diagnostic accu-
racy, which is also the one most widely used for melanoma detection:
pattern analysis. It uses a set of global (textured patterns covering most
of the lesion) and local features (representing characteristics that appear
in part of the lesion) to differentiate between melanomas and benign
melanocytic lesions. We treated the decision to classify a lesion as mel-
anoma as a positive test result.
The review board of the Second University of Naples waived
approval because the study did not affect routine procedures. All parti-
cipating dermatologists signed a consent form before participating in
the study.
Forecasting dataset
The forecasting dataset is part of the Good Judgment Project (19).
This is a large-scale forecasting project running over several years and
using a wide variety of participants and settings (e.g., training schedules
and team competitions). We used data from the first year of the
forecasting project (47). In this year, 102 questions, such as “Will Serbia
be officially granted EU candidacy by 31 December 2011?” and “Will
the Nikkei 225 index finish trading at or above 9500 on 30 September
2011?” had to be forecasted. Participants were asked to estimate the
probability of the future event. We excluded questions with more than
two possible answers and questions for which the correct answer could
not be irrefutably determined (n = 8).We excluded forecasters who did
not complete all remaining 94 questions, resulting in 90 forecasters. The
total dataset we used thus contained 8460 forecasts by 90 forecasters on
94 geopolitical events. Sometimes, forecasters updated their forecasts
over time, thereby giving multiple responses. In these cases, we used
their first forecast only. To investigate the case of binary decision-
making, we converted the probability scores into 0 (probabilities
<0.5) and 1 (probabilities >0.5). Scores that were 0.5 were randomly
converted to either 0 or 1. In fig. S4,we investigate a scenariowhenusing
the probability scores directlywithout any conversion. Participantswere
free to enter the forecasting competition, and the subject pool consisted
of a mix of laypeople and geopolitical experts.
General knowledge dataset
This dataset is based on study 3 in (20) and contains binary responses to
the question, “Which of the following two cities has more inhabitants?”
The stimulus set consisted of 1000 randomly generated pairs of cities
from a list of the 100 most populous cities in the United States in
2010 as determined by the U.S. Census Bureau. After observing a fixa-
tion cross, participants saw a pair of cities, and after 1.6 s, theywere cued
to make a decision. Participants rated 1000 pairs, distributed over two
sessions. Participants (n = 109) were recruited from the Michigan State
University (MSU) psychology research participant pool and received8 of 10
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Eclass credits plus a $0 to $4 bonus per session. Informed consent was
obtained from participants according to the guidelines of the MSU In-
stitutional Review Board. We excluded participants who did not com-
plete both sessions, resulting in 99 participants, all of whom provided a
decision on each of the 1000 city pairs.
Empirical analysis: Individual decision makers
To study the relationship between individuals’ decision similarity and
decision accuracy, we calculated, within each dataset each individual’s
accuracy. For the forecasting and the general knowledge dataset, we
used proportion correct. For the medical datasets, we used balanced
accuracy, defined as (sensitivity + specificity)/2. This implies
weighting the misclassification errors of positive and negative cases
inversely proportional to their prevalence; in case of a 50% prevalence,
balanced accuracy reduces to proportion correct. Using balanced ac-
curacy circumvents the problem that proportion correct faces, namely,
that when the prevalence becomes highly asymmetric, one can always
perform well by always predicting the more frequent outcomes (e.g., if
the prevalence of cancer is 10%, always predicting no cancer gives a pro-
portion correct of 90%, but a balanced accuracy of 50%). Next, we
calculated each individual’s average decision similarity. For this, we used
the percentage agreement, which ranges from 0 (never made the same
decision for a case) to 1 (alwaysmade the same decision for all cases).
To quantify the relationship between average decision similarity and
individual accuracy (Fig. 3), we used Spearman’s rank correlations
(cor.test) in R (version 3.4.4).
To test whether decision similarity can be used to predict high-
performing individuals, we performed a cross-validation procedure
using a training and test set procedure. Within each dataset, we ran-
domly drewm cases to create a training set (varyingm from 0 to 60 in
steps of 5). Part of the remaining cases were used for forming a test
set. As size of the test set, we used the total number of cases in a dataset
minus the maximum size of the training set (i.e., 60). This assured that,
within each dataset, the test set size was the same across all number of
training images, making the results comparable across training set
sizes. In the training set, we calculated each individual’s average de-
cision similarity with all others (i.e., percentage agreement). We then
ranked all individuals based on their decision similarity in the training
set and tested their performance in the test set using different similarity
thresholds (Fig. 4 and fig. S5). For example, in Fig. 4, the top 25%
corresponds to individuals with the 25% highest decision similarity
values in the training set. Similarly, in fig. S5, the bottom 25%
corresponds to individuals with the 25% lowest decision similarity
values in the training set. We repeated each number of training images
1000 times in each dataset and report the average values.
Empirical analysis: Groups of decision makers
To study the relationship between decision similarity of groupmembers
and collective accuracy, we randomly sampled, from each dataset, 100
unique groups of n individuals (n = 3 and 9). For each group, we
calculated the (i) average individual decision similarity (i.e., the average
percentage agreement of all possible pairwise combinations of group
members), (ii) average individual accuracy of the group members,
and (iii) accuracy of the majority rule (Fig. 5, B to E, and fig. S7).
To test whether decision similarity can be used to predict high-
performing groups, we performed a cross-validation procedure using a
training and test set procedure.Within each dataset, we randomly drew
m cases to create a training set (varyingm from 0 to 60 in steps of 5) and
used part of the remaining cases to form a test set using the procedureKurvers et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaaw9011 20 November 2019described above. Within a training set, we calculated the average deci-
sion similarity of each rater and ranked individuals according to their
decision similarity. We then created groups of three raters, calculated
their average decision similarity, and tested the performance of these
groups in the test set using different similarity thresholds (Fig. 6 and
fig. S8). For example, in Fig. 6, the top 25% corresponds to groups with
the 25% highest decision similarity values in the training set. We re-
peated each number of training images 1000 times in each dataset
and report the average values.SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/5/11/eaaw9011/DC1
Supplementary text
Fig. S1. Distribution of individuals’ level of accuracy and correlated decisions in the four
datasets.
Fig. S2. High-performing individuals are similar to each other, while low-performing individuals
tend to make dissimilar decisions.
Fig. S3. Decision similarity performs well for cases in which the majority decided correctly but
breaks down for cases in which the minority decided correctly.
Fig. S4. The similarity-accuracy relationship is also present when using the continuous
probability forecasts.
Fig. S5. Decision similarity permits identification of low-performing individuals.
Fig. S6. Decision similarity permits identification of high-performing (and low-performing)
individuals in small groups.
Fig. S7. The relationship between decision similarity of a group of nine individuals and their
individual and collective accuracy.
Fig. S8. Decision similarity permits identification of low-performing groups.
Fig. S9. In each of the four datasets, the average decision similarity to others tightly correlates
with the decision similarity to the majority judgment.
Fig. S10. Decision similarity to the majority tightly correlates with decision accuracy in breast
and skin cancer diagnostics, geopolitical forecasting, and a general knowledge task.
Skin cancer data set
R Code numerical simulations (Fig. 2B)
View/request a protocol for this paper from Bio-protocol.REFERENCES AND NOTES
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